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Abstract
cleverhans is a software library that provides standardized reference
implementations of adversarial example construction techniques and ad-
versarial training. The library may be used to develop more robust ma-
chine learning models and to provide standardized benchmarks of models’
performance in the adversarial setting. Benchmarks constructed without a
standardized implementation of adversarial example construction are not
comparable to each other, because a good result may indicate a robust
model or it may merely indicate a weak implementation of the adversarial
example construction procedure.
This technical report is structured as follows. Section 1 provides an
overview of adversarial examples in machine learning and of the cleverhans
software. Section 2 presents the core functionalities of the library: namely
the attacks based on adversarial examples and defenses to improve the ro-
bustness of machine learning models to these attacks. Section 3 describes
how to report benchmark results using the library. Section 4 describes
the versioning system.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are inputs crafted by making slight perturbations to legit-
imate inputs with the intent of misleading machine learning models [18]. The
perturbations are designed to be small in magnitude, such that a human ob-
server would not have difficulty processing the resulting input. In many cases,
the perturbation required to deceive a machine learning model is so small that
a human being may not be able to perceive that anything has changed, or even
so small that an 8-bit representation of the input values does not capture the
perturbation used to fool a model that accepts 32-bit inputs. We invite read-
ers unfamiliar with the concept to the detailed presentation in [18, 11, 17, 4].
Although completely effective defenses have yet to be proposed, the most suc-
cessful to date is adversarial training [18, 11]. Different sources of adversarial
examples used in the training process can make adversarial training more effec-
tive; as of this writing, to the best of our knowledge, the most effective version
of adversarial training on ImageNet is ensemble adversarial training [23] and
the most effective version on MNIST is the basic iterative method [12] applied
to randomly chosen starting points [14].
The cleverhans library provides reference implementations of the attacks,
which are intended for use for two purposes. First, machine learning develop-
ers may construct robust models by using adversarial training, which requires
the construction of adversarial examples during the training procedure. Sec-
ond, we encourage researchers who report the accuracy of their models in the
adversarial setting to use the standardized reference implementation provided
by cleverhans. Without a standard reference implementation, different bench-
marks are not comparable—a benchmark reporting high accuracy might indicate
a more robust model, but it might also indicate the use of a weaker attack im-
plementation. By using cleverhans, researchers can be assured that a high
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accuracy on a benchmark corresponds to a robust model.
Implemented in TensorFlow [1], cleverhans is designed as a tool to help de-
velopers add defenses against adversarial examples to their models and bench-
mark the robustness of their models to adversarial examples. The interface for
cleverhans is designed to accept models implemented using any model frame-
work ( such as Keras [9]) or implemented without any specific model abstraction.
The cleverhans library is a collaboration is free, open-source software, li-
censed under the MIT license. The project is available online through GitHub1.
The main communication channel for developers of the library is a mailing list,
whose discussions are publicly available online2.
2 Core functionalities
The library’s package is organized by modules. The most important modules
are:
• attacks: contains the Attack class, defining the interface used by all
CleverHans attacks, as well as implementations of several specific attacks.
• model: contains the Model class, which is a very lightweight class defining
a simple interface that models should implement in order to be compati-
ble with Attack. CleverHans includes a Model implementation for Keras
Sequential models and examples of Model implementations for Tensor-
Flow models that are not implemented using any modeling framework
library.
In the following, we describe some of the research results behind the imple-
mentations made in cleverhans.
2.1 Attacks
Adversarial example crafting algorithms implemented in cleverhans take a
model, and an input, and return the corresponding adversarial example. Here
are the algorithms currently implemented in the attacks module.
2.1.1 L-BFGS Method
The L-BFGS method was introduced by Szegedy et al. [18]. It aims to solve the
following box-constrained optimization problem:
minimize ‖x0 − x‖
2
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such that C(x) = l
where x ∈ [0, 1]p (1)
The computation is approximated by using box-constrained L-BFGS optimiza-
tion.
1https://github.com/openaicleverhans
2https://groups.google.com/group/cleverhans-dev
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2.1.2 Fast Gradient Sign Method
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) was introduced by Goodfellow et al. [11].
The intuition behind the attack is to linearize the cost function J used to train
a model f around the neighborhood of the training point ~x that the adversary
wants to force the misclassification of. The resulting adversarial example ~x∗
corresponding to input ~x is computed as follows:
~x∗ ← x+ ε · ∇~xJ(f, θ, ~x) (2)
where ε is a parameter controlling the magnitude of the perturbation introduced.
Larger values increase the likelihood that ~x∗ will be misclassified by f , but make
the perturbation easier to detect by a human.
The fast gradient sign method is available by calling attacks.fgsm() The
implementation defines the necessary graph elements and returns a tensor, which
once evaluated holds the value of the adversarial example corresponding to
the input provided. The implementation is parameterized by the parameter
ε introduced above. It is possible to configure the method to clip adversarial
examples so that they are constrained to be part of the expected input domain
range.
2.1.3 Carlini-Wagner Attack
The Carlini-Wagner (C&W) attack was introduced by Carlini et al. [5]. Inspired
by [18], the authors formulate finding adversarial examples as an optimization
problem; find some small change δ that can be made to an input x that will
change its classification, but so that the result is still in the valid range. They
instantiate the distance metric with an Lp norm, define a success function f
such that f(x+ δ) ≤ 0 if and only if the model misclassifies, and minimize the
sum with a trade-off constant ‘c’. ‘c’ is chosen by modified binary search, the
box constraint is resolved by applying a change-of-variables, and the Adam [2]
optimizer is used to solve the optimization instance.
The attack has been shown to be quite powerful [5, 6], however this power
comes at the cost of speed, as this attack is often much slower than others.
The attack can be sped up by fixing ‘c’ (instead of performing modified binary
search).
The Carlini-Wagner attack is available by instantiating the attack object
with attacks.CarliniWagnerL2 and then calling the generate() function.
This generates the symbolic graph and returns a tensor, which once evaluated
holds the value of the adversarial example corresponding to the input provided.
As the name suggests, the Lp norm used in the implementation is L2. The
attack is controlled by a number of parameters, namely the confidence, which
defines the margin between logit values necessary to succeed, the learning rate
(step-size), the number of binary search steps, the number of iterations per
binary search step, and the initial ‘c’ value.
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2.1.4 Elastic Net Method
The Elastic Net Method (EAD) was introduced by Chen et al. [7]. Inspired by
the C&W attack [5], finding adversarial examples is formulated as an optimiza-
tion problem. The same loss function as used by the C&W attack is adopted,
however instead of performing L2 regularization, elastic-net regularization is
performed, with β controlling the trade-off between L1 and L2. The iterative
shrinkage-thresholding algorithm (ISTA) [3]. ISTA can be viewed as a regu-
lar first-order optimization algorithm with an additional shrinkage-thresholding
step on each iteration.
Notably, the C&W L2 attack becomes a special case of the EAD formula-
tion, with β = 0. However, one can view EAD as a robust version of the C&W
method, as the ISTA operation shrinks a value of the adversarial example if the
deviation to the original input is greater than β, and leaves the value unchanged
if the deviation is less than β. Empirical results support this claim, demonstrat-
ing the attack’s ability to bypass strong detection schemes and succeed against
robust adversarially trained models while still producing adversarial examples
with minimal visual distortion [7, 22, 21, 13].
The Elastic Net Method is available by instantiating the attack object with
attacks.ElasticNetMethod and then calling the generate() function. This
generates the symbolic graph and returns a tensor, which once evaluated holds
the value of the adversarial example corresponding to the input provided. The
attack is controlled by a number of parameters, most of which are shared with
the C&W attack, namely the confidence, which defines the margin between logit
values necessary to succeed, the learning rate (step-size), the number of binary
search steps, the number of iterations per binary search step, and the initial ‘c’
value. Additional parameters include β, the elastic-net regularization constant,
and the decision rule, whether to choose successful adversarial examples with
minimal L1 or elastic-net distortion.
2.1.5 Basic Iterative Method
The basic iterative method (BIM) was introduced by Kurakin et al. [12], and
extends the “fast” gradient method by applying it multiple times with small
step size, clipping values of intermediate results after each step to ensure that
they are in an ε-neighborhood of the original input.
The basic iterative method is available by instantiating the attack object
with attacks.BasicIterativeMethod and then calling the generate() func-
tion. This generates the symbolic graph and returns a tensor, which once eval-
uated holds the value of the adversarial example corresponding to the input
provided. The attack is parameterized by ε, alike the fast gradient method,
but also by the step-size for each attack iteration and the number of attack
iterations.
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2.1.6 Projected Gradient Descent
The projected gradient descent (PGD) attack was introduced by Madry et
al. [14]. The authors state that the basic iterative method (BIM) [12] is es-
sentially projected gradient descent on the negative loss function. To explore
the loss landscape further, PGD is re-started from many points in the L∞ balls
around the input examples.
PGD is available by instantiating the attack object with attacks.MadryEtAl
and then calling the generate() function. This generates the symbolic graph
and returns a tensor, which once evaluated holds the value of the adversarial
example corresponding to the input provided. PGD shares many parameters
with BIM, such as ε, the step-size for each attack iteration, and the number of
attack iterations. An additional parameter is a boolean which specifies whether
or not to add an initial random perturbation.
2.1.7 Momentum Iterative Method
The momentum iterative method (MIM) was introduced by Dong et al. [10]. It
is a technique for accelerating gradient descent algorithms by accumulating a
velocity vector in the gradient direction of the loss function across iterations.
BIM with incorporated momentum applied to an ensemble of models won first
place in both the NIPS 2017 Non-Targeted and Targeted Adversarial Attack
Competitions [16].
The momentum iterative method is available by instantiating the attack ob-
ject with attacks.MomentumIterativeMethod and then calling the generate()
function. This generates the symbolic graph and returns a tensor, which once
evaluated holds the value of the adversarial example corresponding to the in-
put provided. MIM shares many parameters with BIM, such as ε, the step-size
for each attack iteration, and the number of attack iterations. An additional
parameter is a decay factor which can be applied to the momentum term.
2.1.8 Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach
The Jacobian-based saliency map approach (JSMA) was introduced by Papernot
et al. [17]. The method iteratively perturbs features of the input that have large
adversarial saliency scores. Intuitively, this score reflects the adversarial goal of
taking a sample away from its source class towards a chosen target class.
First, the adversary computes the Jacobian of the model and evaluates it
in the current input: this returns a matrix
[
∂fj
∂xi
(~x)
]
i,j
where component (i, j)
is the derivative of class j with respect to input feature i. To compute the
adversarial saliency map, the adversary then computes the following for each
input feature i:
S(~x, t)[i] =
{
0 if ∂ft(~x)
∂~xi
< 0 or
∑
j 6=t
∂fj(~x)
∂~xi
> 0(
∂ft(~x)
∂~xi
) ∣∣∣∑j 6=t ∂fj(~x)∂~xi
∣∣∣ otherwise (3)
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where t is the target class that the adversary wants the machine learning model
to assign. The adversary then selects the input feature i with the largest saliency
score S(~x, t)[i] and increases its value3. The process is repeated until misclas-
sification in the target class is achieved or the maximum number of perturbed
features has been reached.
In cleverhans, the Jacobian-based saliency map approach may be called
with attacks.jsma(). The implementation returns the adversarial example
directly, as well as whether the target class was achieved or not, and how many
input features were perturbed.
2.1.9 DeepFool
DeepFool was introduced by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [15]. Unlike most of the
attacks described here, it cannot be used in the targeted case, where the attacker
specifies what target class the model should classify the adversarial example as.
It can only be used in the non-targeted case, where the attacker can only ensure
that the the model classifies the adversarial example in a class different from
the original.
Inspired by the fact that the corresponding separating hyperplanes in linear
classifiers indicate the decision boundaries of each class, DeepFool aims to find
the least distortion (in terms of euclidean distance) leading to misclassification
by projecting the input example to the closest separating hyperplane. An ap-
proximate iterative algorithm is proposed for attacking neural networks in order
to tackle its inherent nonlinearities.
DeepFool is available by instantiating the attack object with attacks.DeepFool
and then calling the generate() function. This generates the symbolic graph
and returns a tensor, which once evaluated holds the value of the adversarial
example corresponding to the input provided. DeepFool has a few parameters,
such as the number of classes to test against, a termination criterion to prevent
vanishing updates, and the maximum number of iterations.
2.1.10 Feature Adversaries
Feature Adversaries were introduced by Sabour et al. [20]. Instead of solely con-
sidering adversaries which disrupt classification, termed label adversaries, the
authors considered adversarial examples which are confused with other exam-
ples not just in class label, but in their internal representations as well. Such
examples are generated by feature adversaries.
Such feature adversarial examples are generated by minimizing the euclidean
distance between the internal deep representation (at a specified layer) while
constraining the distance between the input and adversarial example in terms
of L∞ to be less than δ. The optimization is conducted using box-constrained
L-BFGS.
3In the original paper and the cleverhans implementation, input features are selected by
pairs using the same heuristic.
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Feature adversaries are available by instantiating the attack object with
attacks.FastFeatureAdversaries and then calling the generate() function.
This generates the symbolic graph and returns a tensor, which once evaluated
holds the value of the adversarial example corresponding to the input provided.
The implementation is parameterized by the following set of parameters: ε, the
step-size for each attack iteration, the number of attack iterations, and the layer
to target.
2.1.11 SPSA
Simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) was introduced by
Uesato et al. [24]. SPSA is a gradient-free optimization method, which is useful
when the model is non-differentiable, or more generally, the gradients do not
point in useful directions. Gradients are approximated using finite difference
estimates [8] in random directions.
SPSA is available by instantiating the attack object with attacks.SPSA and
then calling the generate() function. This generates the symbolic graph and
returns a tensor, which once evaluated holds the value of the adversarial example
corresponding to the input provided. The implementation is parameterized
by the following set of parameters: ε, the number of optimization steps, the
learning rate (step-size), and the perturbation size used for the finite difference
approximation.
2.2 Defenses
The intuition behind defenses against adversarial examples is to make the model
smoother by limiting its sensitivity to small perturbations of its inputs (and
therefore making adversarial examples harder to craft). Since all defenses cur-
rently proposed modify the learning algorithm used to train the model, we
implement them in the modules of cleverhans that contain the functions used
to train models. In module utils tf, the following defenses are implemented.
2.2.1 Adversarial training
The intuition behind adversarial training [18, 11] is to inject adversarial ex-
amples during training to improve the generalization of the machine learning
model. To achieve this effect, the training function tf model train() imple-
mented in module utils tf can be given the tensor definition for an adversarial
example: e.g., the one returned by the method described in Section 2.1.2. When
such a tensor is given, the training algorithm modifies the loss function used to
optimize the model parameters: it is in that case defined as the average be-
tween the loss for predictions on legitimate inputs and the loss for predictions
made on adversarial examples. The remainder of the training algorithm is left
unchanged.
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3 Reporting Benchmark Results
This section provides instructions for how to preprare and report benchmark
results.
When comparing against previously published benchmarks, it is best to to
use the same version of cleverhans as was used to produce the previous bench-
marks. This minimizes the possibility that an undetected change in behavior
between versions could cause a difference in the output of the benchmark results.
When reporting new results that are not directly compared to previous work,
it is best to use the most recent versioned release of cleverhans.
In all cases, it is important to report the version number of cleverhans.
In addition to this information, one should also report which attack methods
were used, and the values of any configuration parameters used for these attacks.
For example, you might report “We benchmarked the robustness of our
method to adversarial attack using v2.1.0 of CleverHans (Papernot et al. 2018).
On a test set modified by fgsm with eps of 0.3, we obtained a test set accuracy
of 97.9%.”
The library does not provide specific test datasets or data preprocessing.
End users are responsible for appropriately preparing the data in their specific
application areas, and for reporting sufficient information about the data pre-
processing and model family to make benchmarks appropriately comparable.
4 Versioning
Because one of the goals of cleverhans is to provide a basis for reproducible
benchmarks, it is important that the version numbers provide useful informa-
tion. The library uses semantic versioning,4 meaning that version numbers take
the form of MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.
The PATCH number increments whenever backwards-compatible bug fixes
are made. For the purpose of this library, a bug is not considered backwards-
compatible if it changes the results of a benchmark test. The MINOR number
increments whenever new features are added in a backwards-compatible manner.
The MAJOR number increments whenever an interface changes.
Any time a bug in CleverHans affects the accuracy of any performance num-
ber reported as a benchmark result, we consider fixing the bug to constitute an
API change (to the interface mapping from the specification of a benchmark
experiment to the reported performance) and increment the MAJOR version
number when we make the next release. For this reason, when writing aca-
demic articles, it is important to compare CleverHans benchmark results that
were produced with the same MAJOR version number. Release notes accom-
panying each revision indicate whether an increment to the MAJOR number
invalidates earlier benchmark results or not.
Release notes for each version are available at https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/releases
4http://semver.org/
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